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Abstract
Background: In a growing number of humanitarian crises, “remote management” is negotiated across borders and
implemented by humanitarian agencies through “local actors” to deliver assistance. However, the narrative
describing the involvement of local actors in the delivery of humanitarian aid in armed conflict settings remains
reductionist and unreflective of the complex and circular course of the “localisation of aid”. This paper explores
cross-border humanitarian assistance within the Syrian conflict. We document how humanitarian actors operate to
deliver humanitarian health care in North-West Syria (Turkish border), explore their challenges and critique the
language used within current debates on the localisation of aid.
Methods: We undertook key informant interviews with Turkey-based humanitarian aid professionals involved in the
humanitarian health response inside Syria. We integrated data previously collected for The Lancet-American
University of Beirut Commission on Syria during field work in Gaziantep, Turkey, through meetings, conversations,
discussions and expert consultations with Syrian health professionals, WHO-Turkey staff members and members of
Syrian health directorates. We also drew from background desk reviews conducted by the Commission on health
systems responses and timeline of events in Turkey during the Syrian conflict.
Results: This paper uncovers creative and effective bottom-up strategies that enhanced cross-border coordination
of aid delivery into Syria. Our findings unravel the key role played by Syrian providers in accessing vulnerable
populations and in reshaping coordination and funding mechanisms inside Syria, as well as the disproportionate
risks local actors bear within the response. Our findings also reveal an iterative negotiation of decision-making
dynamics, a “low-profile approach” promoted to gain access to populations of concerns, and an environment that
is heavily shaped by close interpersonal relationships and social trust.
Conclusions: Our multifaceted narrative unpacks circular flows of interactions among actors and uncovers
strategies developed by practitioners on the field, which are often left undocumented. We argue that there is an
opportunity for the humanitarian sector to learn from these synergies to rethink how medical humanitarianism is
framed (hopefully leading to a more collaborative framing that resists mainstreaming “local” actors within a
“traditional” system). There is also an opportunity for the humanitarian and global health communities to reflect on
how value attributed to human lives needs to be questioned in contexts where national staff face a
disproportionate risk to deliver aid.
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Background
In armed conflict settings, international humanitarian
agencies generally adapt their structures and operations
in response to constraints in securing humanitarian
space. Increasingly, working through various local aid
actors with better access to affected populations is pre-
ferred to direct operations. In a growing number of hu-
manitarian crises, “remote management” has been
negotiated across borders and implemented by humani-
tarian agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance, often
with a local actor implementing services on the ground
[1]. Narratives of this modality of delivering aid arguably
remain reductionist, particularly with regards to the in-
volvement of local actors and the underlying political
nature of the localisation of aid. Language used to refer
to the roles and integration of local actors into the hu-
manitarian system (“localisation”) has nonetheless been
evolving, as exemplified by the 2016 World Humanitar-
ian Summit. Notably, the Summit’s Grand Bargain agree-
ment commits “donors and aid organizations to provide
25 per cent of global humanitarian funding to local and
national responders by 2020” through “multi-year invest-
ment in the institutional capacities of local and national
responders […] and [incorporating] capacity strengthen-
ing in partnership agreements”. [2, 3] These statements
acknowledge a need to reconsider power relationships
within the humanitarian landscape and that reinforcing
the role of local actors necessitates building their capaci-
ties. As for the political nature of the localisation of aid,
it has also been increasingly recognised in humanitarian
conversations, contrasting with views considering local-
isation as a logistic exercise [4].
Cross-border humanitarian practices and remote man-
agement have been used in the past in the humanitarian
sector, as exemplified in conflict settings such as Somalia,
South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. This history of hu-
manitarianism, has shaped the ways in which humanitar-
ian agencies have responded to the conflict in Syria:
“[One] direct response to rising insecurity has been re-
mote management, wherein intervening aid organiza-
tions have responded to heightened risk by withdrawing
key senior international staff and upper national man-
agement from the conflict zone, and instead relying on
local staff or partners to continue programming at re-
duced levels. The second is an industry trend towards
the localization or local ownership of programs” [5].
The logic supporting the localisation agenda is
multi-layered. On one operational level, “local actors” are
de facto players who are already driving responses during
natural disasters (e.g. the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami), epi-
demics (e.g. 2014 West Africa Ebola) and conflict settings
such as Syria where international actors may lack secure ac-
cess [6]. On another operational level, it is recognised that
only a less bureaucratic, decentralised humanitarian
architecture could lead to more effective responses, and
that local actors with their sustained presence also provide
a bridge from humanitarian assistance to development. [7]
At the governance level, localisation challenges a certain
ontology of power governing the western-led humanitarian
system in which partnerships are forged in such ways that
international western actors hold power over local partners.
The main critique to localisation of aid to date comes
from humanitarian actors expressing concerns about the
capacity of local actors to scale up interventions, and
about the political neutrality of local actors in times of
conflicts. The former argument may hold true in many
instances and can be partially addressed with adequate
training and capacity building, while the latter tackles
the humanitarian principles of “neutrality”, and needs
some broader political reflection within a context of vio-
lence. Localisation discussions to date overlook that be-
ing labelled as “local” comes with a number of risks,
including jeopardizing one’s life to care for others. The
very term “local actors” remains loose, referring to “a
very wide range of different stakeholders: from govern-
ment authorities at various levels, via NGOs, other civil
society groupings and private businesses, to every native
individual or community [members]” [7].
Given the above, documenting the role played by and
the experiences of emergent local actors in humanitarian
responses, particularly the Syrian context, has become of
interest to us. The rationale behind this is that unravelling
the experiences of local actors — including their coping
mechanisms as well as the burden and trauma they bear
in the process — and integrating them within humanitar-
ian discussions and coordination mechanisms could con-
tribute to imagining a more equitable and efficient aid
delivery model; one that would not end up reproducing
the very power relationships that it sets out to address.
The Syrian conflict provides an important case study
with respect to the localisation of aid and the language
used to unpack it. While the Syrian government has long
stopped supporting medical facilities in opposition terri-
tories [8], access to conflict-affected populations by hu-
manitarian agencies inside Syria has been challenging
since the start of the conflict. The lack of guaranteed se-
curity for staff, complicated by constant threats and at-
tacks on health care workers and facilities [9], have led
most international organisations (IOs) and International
Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to operate
remotely across the Turkish, Jordanian, Lebanese and
Iraqi borders through local partnerships [10], while
other IOs and INGOs have chosen to manage their hu-
manitarian operations from Damascus, Syria. In that re-
spect, the role of “local actors” has become prominent
and essential. Still, “Syrian actors’ share of international
humanitarian funding in no way matches their role in
the actual delivery of assistance” [11].
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We present a case study (North-West Syria – Turkish
border; September 2017) of the above dynamics, while rely-
ing on information gathered earlier in 2017 (May and July
2017) as well as multiple desk reviews. The analysis is pre-
sented through a multifaceted narrative that unpacks the
circular flows of interactions and dynamics among actors,
which, in turn, contributes to the development of a dy-
namic framing of medical humanitarianism. In contrast to
the classic model of international health response, we draw
on Hilhorst and Janssen’s work on the everyday politics of
aid [12], to explore how the language of medical humani-
tarianism is being (re)articulated and (re)implemented in
different ways by different sets of health actors in highly
political and unstable spaces. We also draw on the concept
of therapeutic geographies used to “account for the remap-
ping of health care” in conflict [13]. Our empirical perspec-
tive offers logistical insights into the cross-border practices
of healthcare services provision inside Syria and contributes
to the discussions on the institutionalisation of a “politics of
life” [14], whereby Syrian first responders and health pro-
viders are pushed to accept a disproportionate safety risk to
ensure service implementation.
Methods
Study setting
At the time of our study in September 2017, access to the
70-some functioning health facilities in North-West Syria
was still constrained by major challenges of safety and se-
curity, financing and coordination. Bombings were intensi-
fying in North-West Syria affecting hospitals run or
supported by the organisations in which some of our infor-
mants worked — these organisations had to operate with
minimum staff or close. Country directors and field coordi-
nators were communicating with their staff on Skype,
WhatsApp, as well as with ground informants providing
regular security updates. International humanitarian staff
based in Turkey had generally not been able to visit pro-
jects inside Syria since late 2013. However, Syrian staff
regularly crossed into Syria, apart from when border cross-
ings were insecure. Hence, NGOs relied extensively on
their Syrian cross-border staff and on the internet to com-
municate with their partners inside Syria. Information was
flowing between Syrian medical doctors from inside and
outside Syria, Gaziantep-based NGOs and the UN agencies
to gather information to anticipate attacks on or near
health facilities, and make informed decisions on whether
facilities should be running with minimal staff or closed
altogether. Communication and decision-making mecha-
nisms seemed to reflect well-established practices as inter-
viewees constantly reflected on the problems they faced
and the solutions they identified during earlier similar epi-
sodes. The simultaneous proximity and tangible distance
between actors in Turkey and in Syria were amplified by
the immediate danger faced by staff on the ground in Syria.
Cross-border relationships between humanitarian actors
in Gaziantep and Syria are rooted in historical and former
socio-economic ties, which are constantly reshaped by
local and national politics in Turkey. During the last cen-
tury of Ottoman rule in the Levant, for instance, Gazian-
tep (then known as Antep) was administratively attached
to the Aleppo vilayet [15]. Around 80 years later in 2005,
Aleppo and Gaziantep became official “twin cities”, “an
initiative taken by local authorities to bolster economic,
social and cultural ties between its peoples” [2]. Flows of
people and goods between both cities intensified after that
and “despite a sharp decrease of 45% in 2012, the follow-
ing period from 2010 to 2015 saw a drastic increase of
237% owing largely to the local firms’ share in delivering
humanitarian assistance across the border” [2]. In 2014,
resolution 2165 adopted by the Security Council allowed
the United Nations (UN) and its partners to deliver
cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syria. In 2015,
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs (OCHA) established one of its regional hubs for
cross-border humanitarian assistance in Gaziantep. The
Turkish Red Crescent played a key role in facilitating the
logistics of the cross-border operations. Though collabora-
tions between national and international humanitarian ac-
tors had started in 2012, the 2014 resolution was a
milestone to institutionalise those links. Within this
cross-border humanitarian landscape, Turkey played a key
role in enabling Syrian national NGOs to facilitate cross
border referrals. However, international and
within-Turkey politics have affected cross-border activ-
ities. As of January 2015, “the introduction of new regula-
tions [had] adversely affected [the ability of] Syrian staff
from NGOs […] providing assistance to Syria […] to cross
the border regularly to accompany shipments and conduct
programming activities” [16]. Furthermore, in March
2016, the Turkey-EU “refugee deal” was signed, allowing
Greece to return migrants irregularly crossing the Aegean
Sea to Turkey in exchange for visa facilitations financial
support for Turkey’s refugees’ population. Since 2017, re-
strictions and bureaucratic delays to deal with INGO pro-
posals and actions imposed by the Turkish government
and lack of coordination between government institutions
have posed mounting challenges to ongoing cross-border
work. After March 2017, Turkish authorities requested
both INGOS and Syrian NGOs re-register and re-apply
for staff work permits, some of which were then rejected.
According to the press [17], these bureaucratic steps
mainly targeted large Western organisations.
Data sources
Our analysis relied on multiple data sources. We undertook
a desk review to identify programmatic documents on
cross-border activities implemented in North-West Syria.
These included OCHA humanitarian bulletins reporting on
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cross-border activities from Turkey into Syria as well as
health cluster bulletins that reported on the humanitarian
response in Syria more broadly (June 2015–September
2017) [18]. In September 2017, we undertook ten key in-
formant interviews in the Turkish border city of Gaziantep
with humanitarian aid professionals (Syrian NGOs per-
sonnel’s, Syrian clinicians, UN and INGOs staff ) involved
in the health humanitarian response inside Syria. A
pre-agreed topic guide informed our interviews, with a
certain degree of flexibility to adjust to unanticipated
themes emerging from our informants’ narratives. In
addition, we drew on field notes from the Research and
Documentation Team (RDT) at The Lancet-AUB Com-
mission on Syria (hereafter referred to as “the Commis-
sion”) gathered during fieldwork in Turkey in May and
July 2017 – this included notes from meetings, conversa-
tions, discussions and expert consultations with Syrian
health professionals, WHO-Turkey and members of Syr-
ian health directorates (health directorates related to the
interim Ministry of Public Health [8], emerged in oppos-
ition areas in Syria to coordinate health activities) [19].
We also drew on background desk reviews undertaken by
the RDT – this included summaries from the grey litera-
ture on health systems responses and timeline of events in
Turkey during the Syrian conflict.
Analysis
We used a thematic qualitative analysis. We reviewed the
key themes that had been identified before data collection
from our desk reviews and literature searches, and identi-
fied unanticipated themes that emerged from the inter-
views. These themes were iteratively discussed within the
research team to locate participants’ views and experi-
ences of cross-border interventions in the humanitarian
literature on the localisation of aid. For the scope of this
paper, we adopted terms such as “international NGOs”,
“national” “NGOs”, “local actors” and “diasporas groups”
as used by policy documents reviewed and interviewees,
and merely reflected on their political implications and
validity from the perspective of the lived experience of
providing health services inside Syria.
Ethics
Ethics approval was granted for this study by the London
School of Hygiene &Tropical Medicine. Meetings and con-
sultations done by the American University of Beirut were
considered by the Institutional Review Board as part of the
general work of the Commission. For the key informant in-
terviews, written or oral informed consent was sought from
participants and confidentiality and anonymity of our infor-
mants was ensured. Interviews were audio recorded unless
interviewees expressed preference otherwise, in which case
detailed notes were taken by researchers. Interviews that
were recorded and notes were stored in a secured password
protected hard drive, and accessed only by the co-authors
who conducted the interviews. For the fieldwork undertook
by the RDT, interviewers from the Commission obtained
oral clearance from interviewees to take notes. Notes were
stored securely and were anonymised and aggregated to
protect the identities of the interviewees and synthesize
information.
Results
Interactions among a wide range of humanitarian actors
to deliver health services inside Syria from Turkey offer
original insights into the politics and logistics of such
partnerships. On the one hand, efforts have been made
to integrate Syrian NGOs in the international response
through the formalisation of coordination structures
(humanitarian coordination meetings initially, and later
a Humanitarian Liaison Group) and pooled funding
mechanisms as well as the activation of UN-led clusters
[20]. Syrian NGOs have also opted for a more formal
structure by creating multiple coordination platforms
over the years — such as the Syrian NGO alliance or the
Syria Relief Network — to facilitate engagement between
Syrian and international humanitarian actors. In
addition, we will show that national NGOs also bring
into these structures local medical staffs from inside
Syria with whom they partner to deliver services to indi-
viduals and communities.
The “low-profile” and “close-ties” approach to
humanitarian access in northern Syria
Beyond the narrow “humanitarian access” terminology
(which may reduce humanitarian routes to logistic consid-
erations), lies a key challenge in creating or developing ef-
fective inter-organisational and interpersonal relationships
among non-state actors collaborating to deliver an inter-
vention in areas where parties in the conflict directly tar-
get health providers. Humanitarian access in Syria has
been constrained by several issues that have evolved over
time, including conflict and attacks on access routes, re-
strictions imposed by the Syrian government and parties
to the conflict and targeting of healthcare workers and fa-
cilities. Access challenges have created the essential condi-
tions for IOs and INGOs to work in partnership with
national NGOs and medical actors in Syria to reach the
most vulnerable, using a low-profile approach: “the use of
smaller tonnage and fewer vehicles at a time, with no
branding, and the use of commercial carriers are common
modalities employed” [21].
In addition to this low-profile approach, our interviews
with Syrian doctors working in the Idlib province in
Syria revealed the centrality of interpersonal trust to en-
able any collaboration with Syrian and non-Syrian actors
offering support from outside the country in the early
phases of the conflict; a phenomenon reminiscent of the
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literature citing the importance of social trust in improv-
ing cooperative relations [22, 23]. In the context we
studied, trust was often present with networks previ-
ously forged, or when being introduced by a trusted
intermediary. For example, while starting to establish
networks with expatriate doctors from outside Syria,
doctors from Idlib initiated limited communication with
few focal points, using pseudonyms, relying on Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs) to hide their internet access,
using Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM cards) with un-
known accounts, etc. Networks were also mobilised in-
side the country to channel medical supplies across
military obstacles, e.g. through doctors sometimes rely-
ing on women from their family, as they were less likely
to be searched at checkpoints. Within this context,
“frontline health workers” become “undercover relief
workers”, putting personal relationships at the centre of
professional partnerships. Even though the humanitarian
and medical work was institutionalised through local
NGOs and INGOs over time, interpersonal relationships
were key to facilitate the development of a coordinated
health response. While interpersonal connections were
crucial in such a context, it emerged from some ac-
counts that they can also burden responders, as personal
disagreements could sometimes affect professional
relationships.
Funding landscape mechanisms
Funding sources for the humanitarian and medical
cross-border response in North West Syria were diverse.
Some of the main ones were institutional donors such as
governments or the European Commission Humanitarian
Fund (ECHO), which were largely covering the majority
of the humanitarian cross-border operations in
North-West Syria. The main channel for this type of fund-
ing was through IOs or INGOs, which were either carry-
ing out the implementation themselves or subcontracting
Syrian NGOs. Funding also came from philanthropists.
This type of funding was channelled through either
INGOs, Syrian NGOs or even grassroots organisations
that had no registration in neither Damascus nor neigh-
bouring countries. However, this funding was running
short as the crisis prolonged. Diaspora networks, com-
posed of Syrian expatriates who established networks in
their countries of residence, also supported the humani-
tarian response in Syria. The early diaspora networks were
mainly medical ones. Some of these networks were insti-
tutionalised and converted into NGOs such as the Syrian
American Medical Society (SAMS) and the Syrian Expa-
triates Medical Association (SEMA). Since both NGOs
had wide networks of members and supporters, they had
flexible funding through membership fees and private do-
nations. This made them more independent from donors’
money fluctuations and constraints. For example, their
private fund (20–30% of the overall funding) was used in
besieged areas where donors were reluctant to fund pro-
jects. In addition, this flexible fund allowed these NGOs to
fill gaps caused by withdrawal of some INGOs after finan-
cial cuts by donors. For instance, SEMA’s flexible funds
allowed it not to withdraw from any project it had started
in the past and fill the gaps caused by the withdrawal of
INGOs. At the time of our interviews, this latter
phenomenon was happening - key international humani-
tarian actors were withdrawing from health facilities and
SEMA was among the NGOs to cover these gaps along-
side with SAMS and the Union for Medical and Relief Or-
ganisations (UOSSM).
Since 2014 and following United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 2139 and 2165, Syrian NGOs have
had direct access to international funds through the Hu-
manitarian Pooled Fund (HPF), a multi-donor, ear-
marked fund managed by UNOCHA to fund the
Humanitarian Response Plan. All international and na-
tional NGOs registered in UNOCHA coordination plat-
forms were eligible to apply for this fund, but this
required registration in Turkey (or another country) and
UNOCHA validation of the organisation’s capacity to
manage resources. Registered NGOs were then classified
into three levels of liability, which determined not only
their eligibility but also the funding ceiling. This adapta-
tion of a global funding scheme to the localisation
framework in Syria was key to facilitate direct funding
from UNOCHA to avoid duplication of effort.
Our research identified several challenges for funding
cross-border activities, including the logistics for cash
flow inside Syria. The collapse of the banking system in
opposition-controlled areas in North-West Syria, for ex-
ample, and the absence of registered money transfer
agencies left humanitarian actors with no option but to
rely on local money transfer agencies (sometimes re-
ferred to as Hawalah). NGOs rely on these agencies to
transfer funds from NGO offices and bank accounts in
Turkey to NGO staff or partners in Syria. Another main
challenge was related to the ambiguity of the Turkish
government legislations in relation to the use of the
above-mentioned system, as there was no previous legal-
isation in place in relation to such system for money
transfer to cover cross-border activities. While the Turk-
ish government was trying to develop a legalisation to
balance between the urgent needs to transfer money for
the operations inside Syria and the need to fully control
the money movement across the border, most cases re-
lated to this issue were discussed through unofficial
channels between NGOs and the Turkish government.
A bottom-up approach to coordination
Complex, bottom-up, personal relationship-driven channels
of coordination emerged among responders implementing
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medical interventions in areas outside the control of the re-
gime. These ultimately shaped global coordination mecha-
nisms for health inside opposition-controlled areas. “Trust”
and “intersubjectivity”, which also manifested themselves in
the “low profile” and “close ties” approach to humanitarian
access discussed above, were central to these coordination
channels, and can only be captured outside a restrictive
emergency framework.
“From the beginning, we were trying to organise our-
selves (…). Sometimes Idlib had no needs so they send
to Homs, trying to organise the response. We deal with
the doctors from outside individually at the beginning
and they know us with our fake names. Inside, there are
two kinds of doctors: field doctors and management
doctors who deal with logistics and coordination. Not
everyone knows the structure of the group for security
issues.” (Syrian clinician).
Inter-individual relations and social networks were key
to develop connections between doctors outside and in-
side Syria as this was a context where health providers
were imprisoned and where the long-term presence of
secret intelligence in the country affected trust among
citizens. Expatriate doctors divided responsibilities for
different regions in Syria according to the access they
had through professional and family networks and con-
tacts. Technicians and experts in telecommunication
from outside and inside the country were involved as
well and provided VPN accounts for activities.
The role played by Syrian providers to coordinate health
activities inside Syria has evolved throughout the conflict.
Syrian health professionals started to organize inside Syria
forming medical committees and health directorates. This
progressively expanded outside the Syrian borders as Syr-
ian NGOs began to have a more active stance in inter-
national coordination mechanisms and as coordination
agencies began to recognize entities inside Syria (such as
health directorates). The role of the multiple interim gov-
ernments of opposition in the cross-border activities in
North-West Syria was limited because of issues related to
legitimacy, stability and resources. In general, it took until
2015 for the coordination to evolve on both sides of the
border including both national and international actors:
“At the beginning we suffered (…) in 2013 when the
health working group started in Antakya. The Syrian
NGOs were seated in a corner without any contribution.
It was not respectful. All the international staff would
speak, and Syrians would stay quiet. One woman who
worked with an international NGO supported us to be
on the table with the other players…Now the health
cluster speaks Arabic and there is a co-lead from a Syr-
ian NGO. Coordination between Syrian NGOs im-
proved, and we advocated that our priority be the
priority of the health cluster.” (Syrian clinician,
Turkey-based Syrian NGO staff member).
Such examples are key to understand the realities of
building up coordination mechanisms in a transnational
humanitarian context while working at the intersection
between health networks that had never met before the
crises. They show that coordination cannot always be
channelled down through vertical processes. While
reflecting on her/his practice during the interview, one
of our informants, who was country director for an
INGO, emphasized the value of coordination mecha-
nisms initiated by Syrian doctors. Such value lay in the
efficiency of those networks in maintaining communica-
tion between different areas and quickly mobilising re-
sources and response to emergencies. Over the years,
these mechanisms became integrated into more formal
platforms of coordination such as the health cluster in
Gaziantep. However, this bottom-up approach is still the
backbone of the coordination mechanisms.
Cross-border monitoring and evaluation
In a context where organisations work remotely to de-
liver medical aid inside Syria, third party monitoring has
been used by some organisations. [24] Monitoring and
evaluation companies were established in Turkey with
field staff and networks inside Syria. These companies
are contracted by INGOs or Syrian NGOs to monitor
and evaluate their projects inside Syria. Some donors
and INGOs made this third party monitoring a reporting
requirement for any project conducted remotely in Syria.
However, some of these monitoring mechanisms have
become challenging in light of reports of private moni-
toring firms disrupting relationships between NGOs and
beneficiaries on the ground as well as relationships be-
tween NGOs and donors [24]. Humanitarian organisa-
tions thus developed creative ways to monitor the
implementation of their intervention without physical
access to the field and to report to their funders. For in-
stance, following the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster As-
sistance (OFDA) investigation that happened in Turkey
in 2016 [25], some INGOs implemented new monitoring
tools such as photographic evidence, GPS location evi-
dence, and paper work (e.g. receipts).
International humanitarian staff who, before working on
the Syrian crisis, used to work in coordination positions
for their organisations, acknowledge that coordinating a
mission always involved working remotely, typically being
based in the capital, with monthly field visits. In contrast,
humanitarian field logisticians felt that their role was rede-
fined by the lack of access to the field, and part of their
professional identity was challenged. In Turkey, one of the
organisations we visited had lost its registration, making it
impossible for staff based on each side of the border to
cross for over a year. The absence of a direct relationship
between IOs staff and beneficiaries restricted efforts to im-
prove accountability to populations in need. In some
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cases, community health workers recruited by organisa-
tions we approached were considered as being the “voice
of the community” inside Syria. The pathways by which
community health workers can truly channel beneficiaries’
views and concerns need to be better understood. How-
ever, there were some innovative approaches to engage
local communities in the process of remote monitoring
through triangle agreements between INGOs, implement-
ing Syrian NGOs and local councils or local committees.
Threeway-communication channels were set up in these
agreements to ensure quality and compliance. Still, other
barriers were faced by humanitarian organisations to
measure the performance of their cross-border pro-
grammes in the Syrian context. To start with, there was
limited circulation of documents, either because that
could put local partners and organisations at risk by ren-
dering their action too visible or because there was lack of
trust in the effectiveness and neutrality of some of the co-
ordination mechanisms that were led either by UN agen-
cies or INGOs that had presence in regime-controlled
areas. This sometimes led to a lack of transparency in
reporting mechanisms [24]. The lack of coordination and
standardization processes on monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms among funders was an additional constraint
faced by local partners in Syria [24].
Localisation processes beyond emergency response
Partnerships developed over time to deliver or support
the provision of health services inside Syria have made
visible the dynamic character of medical humanitarian-
ism. In this section, we will draw on some of our find-
ings on the cross-border response to reflect on
longer-term implications for the Syrian health system
and for the humanitarian sector.
Any health interventions in a humanitarian context
can lead to innovations in the health system, and in
Syria, funding channelled through cross-border mecha-
nisms shaped how health services were prioritised by the
local health authorities formed in opposition-held areas.
[26]. The implementation of an intervention to build
capacity among midwives through training existing mid-
wives and creating a 3-year programme for new recruits
is a good example of such synergies between humanitar-
ian interventions and local health programmes. Accord-
ing to one of our study participants involved in this
initiative, the idea of this intervention was born from a
simple observation: there were fewer gynaecologists in
Syria, yet a large pool of trained midwives persisted;
however, Syrian midwives were not working up to inter-
national guidelines. During the needs assessment phase
of the intervention, discussions took place between the
reproductive healthworking group in Gaziantep and pro-
viders in Syria to identify which resources were needed
at each level of the health system, and what steps should
be taken to have a more effective system. The Minimum
Initial Service Package (MISP) was used as an
evidence-based approach, and it was compared to the
existing health system structure in Syria, with the aim of
decentralising reproductive health services. Community
health workers were tasked with providing advice and
identifying women at risk of pregnancy complications so
that they could be referred. The overall strategy took
nine months of negotiations with local health workers:
doctors, in particular, needed to be convinced that mid-
wives could gain the required skills to work independ-
ently and provide good standards of care. Midwives were
identified during trainings to act as trainers themselves
in Syria. Schools of midwifery were opened, and agree-
ments were made to issue diplomas that would be deliv-
ered by the organisation, health directorates and the
opposition ministry of higher education.
Humanitarian principles in tension
Humanitarian principles (humanity, impartiality, neutral-
ity and independence) were well known by all inter-
national and Syrian NGOs working on the cross-border
response. However, the implementation and monitoring
of these principles through cross-border health activities
was challenging, especially in a context of remote train-
ing of health providers and remote monitoring of activ-
ities. Some relief workers we interviewed raised specific
concerns around the implementation of neutrality. Local
medical and humanitarian workers have their own polit-
ical views, they argued, particularly after witnessing
crimes committed by parties to the conflict and being
threatened or persecuted by the same parties. Therefore,
it might be challenging to be neutral. However, the same
workers had no issues with being impartial. For example,
one interviewee shared an incident where a soldier of
the Syrian army was brought to a hospital supported by
a Syrian NGO. He was provided with the required med-
ical care before opposition groups took him. At the same
time, this NGO and the hospital staff identified them-
selves as part of the revolution against the Syrian gov-
ernment. This account by no mean suggests that
humanitarian actors’ neutrality and impartiality in a con-
flict — including local actors —can be taken for granted.
However, such accounts question the problematic as-
sumption that local actors are by essence less prone to
be neutral and impartial.
In this study, it was important to reflect about values
and principles emerging outside the centres of humani-
tarian action. In our interviews with Syrian doctors in-
volved in the humanitarian response in Syria, for
example, “localisation” emerged as a key principle that
needs to be unpacked. Localisation was valued by local
NGOs providing health services, given their understand-
ing and proximity to the context and the people affected
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by the crisis: “We are the sons of this country”, stated
one of the Syrian doctors we interviewed in Gaziantep
to justify the focus his organisation puts on never inter-
rupting the provision of health services. In our infor-
mants’ discourses, this was associated with a focus on
continuity of health service provision, as opposed to
international organisations.
Localisation was also perceived as a means to avoid
“trends” in interventions that were not adapted to the
field and that might not be sustainable:
“We don’t believe in mobile clinics as a long-term so-
lution. Equipment, labs, privacy of the doctors. At a cer-
tain point in time, mobile clinics became like a fashion
trend. The health system before the war did not have
any mobile clinics. It is hard for doctors to go to the
areas with the mobile clinics. It is exhausting. They
already work in several facilities. In some areas, it was
useful to detect malnutrition and refer them to hospitals.
One organisation wants to implement 25 mobile clinics
and wants to put all the resources in these clinics. We
used to have mobile operation rooms, but it was danger-
ous for doctors. Everything regarding the health project
is dangerous and mobile clinics are not the solution;
even if the car is not visible, the crowd will be visible”
(interview with Syrian doctor).
Although we cannot offer a comprehensive picture ac-
counting for the pros and cons of facilities like mobile
clinics, these field-based perspectives shed light on how
humanitarian interventions were framed by Syrian hu-
manitarian responders, as a reality check on innovation
brought (and sometimes imposed) by international part-
ners and funders.
Study limitations
The spectrum of informants we interviewed for this
study is limited and does not reflect the full range of hu-
manitarian actors involved in the cross-border assistance
for health services from Turkey to North-West Syria.
Notably we did not interview Turkish actors involved in
the response. In addition, the statements of informants
operating inside Syria were exclusively collected from
Turkey as we did not conduct fieldwork in North-West
Syria. A comprehensive political economy analysis is also
lacking in our analysis, which could have played a key
role in determining the attitude, motivations and some
practices of local actors in North-West Syria. However,
such analysis was beyond the scope of this study.
Discussion
While we acknowledge the dynamism of cross-border part-
nerships in general, both the partnerships and health inter-
ventions developed to provide aid in North-West Syria
challenge the typical “humanitarian architecture model”
and uncover the adaptability of complex humanitarian
systems. There is also growing evidence accounting for
convergences between international and local systems in
Syria that go beyond a strict division between system and
non-system actors [20].
In the context of increased international acknowledge-
ment that the humanitarian landscape needs to include
local actors driving responses to crises, the health response
inside opposition-controlled areas in North-West Syria
sheds light on the social networks that have developed
across borders to support or operate health services, their
transformation into more formal coordination structures
(such as the formation of Syrian NGOs alliance, the Syria
Relief Network, inter-cluster coordination mechanisms, co-
ordination with local health entities, etc.…), and the chal-
lenges encountered (such as changes in the Turkish border
management and Turkish government relationship with
INGOs). Intense circular flows of persons, information and
norms across health networks to deliver medical aid inside
Syria suggest that it is “time to let go” of strict categorisa-
tion and hierarchy of actors [27]. Our findings do not sup-
port the validity of a model in which local partners can be
“remotely managed” or “encouraged” from outside Syria
[1]. Dewachi and colleagues used the concept of therapeutic
geographies “defined as the geographic reorganisation of
health care within and across borders under conditions of
war” [13]. Beyond providing access to populations, these
changing therapeutic geographies are challenging the archi-
tecture of humanitarian assistance. Only if we acknowledge
that cross-border interventions do not only reflect a shift in
the management of human resources in humanitarian as-
sistance to provide access, but an in-depth change in impli-
cit rules governing decisions in different sites of the
humanitarian system, can we improve accountability mech-
anisms to populations included or excluded from these dy-
namic systems, and, in fine, imagine the future of
humanitarian interventions. This requires engaging with
the political dimension of healthcare in conflict settings
where the lines between warfare and healthcare are increas-
ingly “blurred” [28]. In North-West Syria, caring for injured
demonstrators or fighters, or building alternative forms of
governance of health services provision, is seen as a chal-
lenge to State authority. This renders health providers as
well as the funding and implementation of certain services
(such as trauma care) highly political.
Our findings highlight the role played by Syrian providers
to access vulnerable populations and their ability to re-
spond to humanitarian norms, as well as their ability to
drive change through the system. However, our findings
also indicate that the localisation agenda, by capacitating
local health workers to assist populations in places where
international staff are unable or unwilling to be present,
can continue to reproduce the very “hierarchies” it aimed
to tackle [29]. The structure of collaborations between
international humanitarian actors operating remotely while
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Syrian actors implementing interventions on the ground
raises questions about the principle of “humanity” in rela-
tion to what Didier Fassin analyses as the “dialectic between
lives to be saved and lives to be risked” [14], and the differ-
ent values attributed to these lives. In our case study, the
question is not only about the price at which humanitarian
workers can risk their lives to save lives, but also whose
lives should be risked rescuing affected populations. This
dialectic is somehow embedded in classic ways of categoris-
ing staff between international and local employees within
humanitarian aid agencies [14]. Cross-border collaborations
between international aid entities working remotely and
Syrian health providers who were already delivering aid in
the country slowly reshaped these collaborations, especially
when Syrian providers were given more space in decision
making and when some Syrian NGOs became eligible for
direct funding. However, this tension between “lives to be
saved and lives to be risked” [14], still needs to be addressed
in a context where aid collaborations have institutionalised
the practices of Syrian local staff being the only humanitar-
ian workers risking their lives on Syrian ground. In
addition, our findings suggest an extension of the politics of
life by highlighting how the idea of commitment often
translates into blurring the lines between personal, profes-
sional and political lives for Syrian health workers who are
negotiating the provision of health services under conflict.
In this sense, when humanitarian actors arguing for a more
cautious implementation of the localisation agenda debate
that neutrality might be problematic in a context where hu-
manitarian workers work in a familiar setting, our paper
shows the need to engage in supporting local actors to miti-
gate risks that they (and their families) would be bearing.
Furthermore, the security rules that constrain international
actors themselves often imply a deliberate and much more
limited acceptance of risk, rather than simply external cir-
cumstances of the operating context: they too should be
considered open to revisit, with an emphasis on equity
among people delivering aid, irrespective of their origin. Fi-
nally, these reflections on “local actors” and their attempts
to build some elements of governance through services’
provision [30], should be accounted for in the reconstruc-
tion arrangements ahead, including in areas taken back by
the government, where health providers and health institu-
tions could be forcibly reintegrated into the traditional
health system of the Ministry of Health. Considering the
different potential scenarios in North-West Syria, the ex-
perience of local actors so far could contribute largely to re-
building the health sector in these areas in the future.
Conclusions
This paper shows that the narrative depicting a humanitar-
ian shift to remote management and localisation from the
perspective of international humanitarian organisations
lacking access to vulnerable communities inside Syria and
deciding to collaborate with local organisations, does not
reflect the complex and circular course of this movement.
Collaborations between “local” and “international” actors
have developed over time through convergent and some-
times competing dynamics, made particularly visible when
looking at the delivery of medical aid inside Syria across the
Turkish border. The role medical Syrian doctors played
early in the conflict in maintaining services and coordinat-
ing a health response on the ground, the support provided
by diaspora doctors and the international and national ef-
forts developed to allow cross-border humanitarian activ-
ities; all participated in progressively institutionalising
partnerships between diverse health networks. We argue
that there is an opportunity for the global health commu-
nity to learn from these negotiated convergent dynamics
and to rethink how we frame medical humanitarianism
(therefore resisting the temptation to mainstream “local”
actors into a “traditional” system). Cross-border humanitar-
ian activities facilitate the creation of new rules that are
often implicit but that give value to the capacity of the hu-
manitarian system to be flexible and adaptive. Local actors’
legitimacy is built upon their access to populations, and
upon their willingness to bear risks that international hu-
manitarian workers would not accept. In this context, “ac-
cess to populations first” becomes a motto. While learning
from the creative and effective bottom-up strategies to en-
hance cross-border coordination, from the importance of
trust and interpersonal relations to develop effective part-
nerships, and from the emergence of “localisation” as a
value, there is a need to reflect on the tensions between
international humanitarian principles and to create mecha-
nisms that improve accountability to populations of con-
cern across and beyond “locality” and “proximity to
populations”. Learning from these collaborations, the hu-
manitarian and global health communities also need to re-
flect on how values are attributed to human lives in
contexts where national staff risk their lives to save lives in
Syria. Finally, this case study highlights the role that profes-
sional networks pre-dating the conflict have played in orga-
nising, channelling and providing services in areas hard to
access by international aid workers. To note, professional
networks can include and exclude populations, and their
potential to reach vulnerable communities during conflicts
should be better understood across sectors.
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